United we stand : the EU and its Member States in the Strasbourg Court. by Delgado Casteleiro,  Andrés
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
27 May 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Delgado Casteleiro, Andres (2014) 'United we stand : the EU and its Member States in the Strasbourg
Court.', in The EU accession to the ECHR. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 105-120. Modern studies in
European law. (48).
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.hartpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?ISBN=9781849465236
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
8 
United We Stand: The EU and its Member 
States in the Strasbourg Court 
 Andrés Delgado Casteleiro

 
I. Introduction 
The accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) will mark not only the beginning of a new era in terms of the protection 
of Fundamental Rights in Europe, but also in terms of the EU’s participation in 
international courts and tribunals. Up until now, the EU has never become a party to an 
international agreement with such a strong adjudicatory body. Therefore, it can be 
expected that the EU’s accession to the ECHR will have important implications for the 
common assumptions surrounding the relationship between the EU and adjudicatory 
decision making of international organisations.
1
 Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that 
the articulation of EU participation in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
will not be replicated in other international agreements with an international court.  
 Consequently, the examination of the mechanism envisaging the EU’s 
participation in ECtHR proceedings undoubtedly raises many interesting issues as 
regards the EU’s external representation. There are many noteworthy questions 
concerning the relationship between the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the 
ECtHR in institutional and substantive terms. This paper focuses on an institutional 
matter, namely, the EU’s locus standi in the ECtHR. More precisely, it examines how 
the draft Accession Agreement
2
 deals with the participation of the EU in the 
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proceedings of the ECtHR; in other words, how the co-respondent mechanism organises 
the participation of the EU and its Member States in ECtHR proceedings. The current 
institutional design of the ECHR, and more specifically the way in which the ECtHR 
works, leads to many problems linked with the future joint participation of the EU and 
its Member States: the lack of legal certainty as regards the respondent and the lack of 
unity when pleading or issues concerning the autonomy of the EU’s legal order3 create 
problems in terms of the EU’s locus standi.  
 As a way of dealing with these issues, the draft Agreement and more precisely 
its Explanatory Report enshrine the so-called co-respondent mechanism. This legal 
device aims at alleviating the different tensions underpinning the accession of the EU, 
such as the different views on the division of competences, the autonomous nature of 
the EU legal order and the problems of legal certainty that the EU’s participation can 
entail. However, a closer look at the co-respondent mechanism will show that certain 
gaps in accountability would still remain after the EU’s accession. This chapter will 
proceed with this examination in three parts. First, it assesses how the co-respondent 
mechanism deals with the main interests affecting EU participation in the ECtHR. 
Second, it shows how the principles that govern the relations between the EU and its 
Member States affect their participation in the proceedings in front of the ECtHR. More 
specifically, it builds on recent developments in the case law of the CJEU on the duty of 
cooperation. Third, it examines whether the EU’s participation in other international 
court proceedings can give us some clues as to how the duty of cooperation might 
operate when pleading in Strasbourg. More precisely, the issue of joint participation in 
front of other international courts will undoubtedly shed some light on how the EU and 
its Member States will act in the Strasbourg Court. In this regard, the chapter concludes 
that the design of the co-respondent mechanism could pose some problems as regards 
the autonomy of EU Member States when pleading in front of the ECtHR. It critically 
concludes that, although innovative, the co-respondent mechanism can restrict the 
autonomy of EU Member States in front of the ECtHR. 
II. The Co-respondent Mechanism: Proceduralising the Problems 
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A. Organising Principles of the Co-respondent Mechanism 
The main reason behind the necessity of a special mechanism dealing with EU 
intervention stems from both the way in which the EU will accede to the ECHR and the 
sui generis nature of the EU. On the one hand, both the EU and its Member States will 
be party to the ECHR. The EU will not replace the Member States, so the division of 
competences and the allocation of responsibilities as regards the ECHR become blurred. 
This becomes especially relevant when speaking about responsibility and locus standi. 
If the division of competence is not settled, it becomes difficult to know who is going to 
be prima facie responsible and consequently who will plead in Strasbourg.  
 While formally the ECHR is not going to differ significantly from any other 
mixed agreement in terms of negotiation, conclusion and ratification, the institutional 
design of the ECHR, and more specifically the way in which the ECtHR functions, has 
the potential to intensify some of the problems linked to mixity.
4
 The co-respondent 
mechanism would aim at alleviating precisely these problems. In this regard, the 
Explanatory Report to the draft Agreement clearly shows that the co-respondent 
mechanism is necessary in order to ‘accommodate the specific situation of the EU as a 
non-State entity with an autonomous legal system that is becoming a Party to the 
Convention alongside its own member States’.5 In other words, the ECHR will be a 
mixed agreement. Since both the EU and its Member States will be parties, the extent to 
which both of them are bound and responsible under the ECHR is unclear. 
 Moreover, the EU implements its acquis in quite a complicated manner, indirect 
administration being the most obvious example. In a nutshell, like other international 
organisations, the EU relies on its Member States for the application and 
implementation of EU law.
6
  The decentralised application of EU law is guided by the 
principle of primacy: all organs of a Member State’s administration—
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executive and judicial—must not apply conflicting national law in every individual case 
before them. From an institutional perspective, national administrations are not 
integrated into the European administrative machinery.
7
 From a functional perspective, 
they operate as a decentralised European administration;
8
 they cannot be considered EU 
organs.
9
 Customs administration constitutes the most obvious example of the EU’s 
executive federalism. Customs falls under the exclusive competence of the EU,
10
 yet 
there are no EU customs administrations. Instead, there are 28 customs administrations 
which implement the EU customs legislation. Therefore, what happens when one of 
these authorities breaches a fundamental right (eg, the right to property)? Who should 
be responsible? Who should stand in front of the ECtHR to defend the compatibility of 
the action of a customs official?  
 Moreover, EU law nowadays operates in even more complex ways, in which the 
principles that govern the relations between EU law and the national realm get diluted. 
Examples of this could be the European Arrest Warrant, in which a framework 
decision
11
 lays down the conditions under which a Member State has the obligation to 
extradite individuals to another Member State.
12
 Thus, could the EU intervene in cases 
dealing with a European Arrest Warrant?  
 In this regard, the Explanatory Report acknowledges the ‘special feature of the 
EU legal system that acts adopted by its institutions may be implemented by its member 
States and, conversely, that provisions of the EU founding treaties agreed upon by its 
member States may be implemented by institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
EU’.13 Therefore, the issue of the implementation of the acquis by Member States and 
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the role of the latter in the decision-making process of the EU will also play a relevant 
role in the co-respondent mechanism.  
 The joint participation of the EU and its Member States, added to the complexity 
in which EU law is implemented, could create uncertainty as to who has competence 
over a certain area, who would be responsible for a specific breach of the ECHR in that 
area and who would have standing. As a matter of practice, when dealing with complex 
issues linked to the division of competences in mixed agreements, the EU has tended to 
proceduralise the matter. Whenever there is some kind of disagreement between the 
diverging interests underpinning an international agreement, the EU and the other 
parties to the agreement tend to favour the inclusion of a procedural solution. Instead of 
establishing clear obligations for all parties, the agreement defers away the obligation 
into procedures and future decision making.
14
 For instance, the EU and its Member 
States agree on an internal procedure, which solves the issue of competence in most of 
the aspects of the international agreement. The decision as to the division of 
competences is postponed to a later stage while assuring the other parties to the 
agreement that the solution to the issue of competence, responsibility or standing will be 
rapidly resolved once the procedure is triggered. Declarations of competence made to 
multilateral environmental agreements
15
 or the institutional arrangement dealing with 
the EU´s participation in the FAO are examples of this tendency to lay down procedures 
dealing with the EU’s participation in a mixed agreement.16  
 These concerns on the division of powers and the legal uncertainty that creates 
can also be found in Article 1 Protocol nº 8 of the Lisbon Treaty. The protocol, which 
deals with the EU accession to the ECHR, provides that: 
‘The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European Convention on 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘European Convention’) provided for in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European 
Union shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and 
Union law, in particular with regard to: 
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[…] (b) the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States 
and individual applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union 
as appropriate.’  
The protocol and by extension EU Member States are concerned that the mixed 
character of the ECHR can lead to the incorrect targeting of the EU or its Member 
States. EU Member States would want to avoid being responsible for acts committed by 
the EU. In this regard, legal certainty works in two directions. The mechanism should 
give the individual bringing the claim certainty that somebody will be held responsible 
for the violation of the ECHR, while at the same time it gives EU Member States 
certainty that they will not be held liable for acts which they are not responsible. Put 
differently, Member States wanted to avoid similar scenarios to the Senator Lines 
case.
17
 In this case, the claimant (Senator Lines) argued that a fine imposed by the 
European Commission, applying EU competition law violated articles 6 and 13 of the 
ECHR. Since the EU was not a party to the ECHR, Senator Lines brought the case 
against the EU Member States. Eventually, the ECtHR declared the application 
inadmissible, due to the fact that the European Commission had annulled the fine. After 
the EU’s accession, a similar case would endanger the autonomy of EU Legal order. 
The EU Member States would be obliged to comply with a judgement that tells them to 
stop applying EU legislation. However since the EU would not be bound by the 
judgment, if the Member States comply with the ECtHR judgment they would be in 
breach of EU aw and vice versa.
18
 Furthermore, a case resembling Senator Lines would 
also create potential problems regarding the vertical division of powers. The Member 
States would be held responsible for an action of the European Commission. Yet, given 
the vertical division of powers in the EU, the Member States have no powers in this 
area. They cannot annul or stop complying with a decision of the Commission unless 
the CJEU has annulled it. Therefore, the EU Member States, after having being held 
responsible by the ECtHR, would need to bring either an infringement action or an 
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annulment action against the Commission.
19
 Obviously, this would put EU Member 
States’ compliance with the ECtHR outside of their control. They cannot simply 
disregard the Commission decision without a prior CJEU decision, which can take 
years.  
 The co-respondent mechanism envisages a procedure which tries to deal with 
such issues as a lack of legal certainty on the question of who should be liable for 
violations of the Convention or the autonomy of the EU legal order understood both as 
the independent legal personality of the EU and the division of competences.
20
 In this 
regard, Article 36(4) ECHR as modified by the draft legal instrument provides that: 
The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become a co-
respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the 
Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to 
the case. The admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the 
participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings. 
This provision enshrines a procedure by which the EU and the Member States will 
jointly participate in the proceedings brought against any of them. The aim of this 
procedure, as mentioned before, is to create a balance between the sui generis nature of 
the EU and legal certainty for the parties to the proceedings. As the Explanatory Report 
shows, the co-respondent mechanism is ‘a way to avoid gaps in participation, 
accountability and enforceability in the Convention system’. The mixed participation of 
the EU and its Member States combined with the complex nature of the EU’s legal 
system could lead to gaps in responsibility,
21
 which in this context means gaps in the 
protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Consequently, the co-respondent 
mechanism establishes that the EU and/or its Member States will take part in the 
proceedings whenever the compatibility between an EU law instrument and a provision 
of the ECHR is called into question.
22
  
 Furthermore, the protocol expresses another concern usually linked with the 
mixed participation in international agreements: the encroachment of competences by 
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the EU through practice. Article 2, Protocol No 8 provides that: ‘The agreement referred 
to in Article 1 shall ensure that accession of the Union shall not affect the competences 
of the Union or the powers of its institutions.’ 
 This kind of statement can also be found in other recent arrangements regarding 
the participation of the EU and its Member States in international organisations. More 
precisely, in a recent arrangement concerning EU statements in multilateral 
organisations (the arrangement), the following disclaimer was added: ‘The adoption and 
presentation of statements does not affect the distribution of competences or the 
allocation of powers between the institutions under the Treaties. Moreover, it does not 
affect the decision-making procedures for the adoption of EU positions by the Council 
as provided in the Treaties.’23 
 The protocol, like the arrangement, put forward the concern of certain Member 
States with regard to the implications that the external representation of the EU has on 
the internal division of powers.
24
 To deal with all these concerns, the draft Agreement 
establishes a new model of proceduralisation of the EU’s participation in international 
agreements. So far, most of the procedures have been of an internal nature. They have 
either been internal arrangements between the different institutions of the EU or 
instruments with international legal effects, albeit unilateral and internal in nature.
25
 As 
a general rule, procedures addressing the EU’s participation in international agreements 
were not included in the body of such agreements. They were required by the 
agreement, but they were considered an internal matter of the EU. The co-respondent 
mechanism breaks with this trend to a certain extent, since it appears that further 
internal rules on the EU’s participation in the ECtHR are being discussed in the EU 
Council of Ministers.
26
  
 Moreover, it appears that the responsibility of the EU and its Member States will 
be joint unless the they decide otherwise.
27
 Consequently, when the co-respondent 
mechanism is triggered, both the EU and at least one of its Member States will stand in 
front of the ECtHR to defend the compatibility of their actions with the provisions of 
                                               
23
 Council Document 15901/11. 
24
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the ECHR. In addition, depending on the nature of the EU legal act called into question, 
the co-respondent mechanism lays down different procedures. 
B. Scenarios that Trigger the Co-respondent Mechanism 
The co-respondent mechanism establishes two different procedures depending on 
whether the breach stems from an EU primary norm (ie, the Treaties) or from a 
secondary norm (ie, regulations, directives, etc.). It lays down a procedure to involve the 
EU or its Member States depending on the type of act which caused the violation of the 
ECHR. If the breach stems from an EU primary norm, a different procedure will apply 
than if the breach stems from an EU secondary provision. By allowing the EU and/or its 
Member States to act as co-respondents, the draft Agreement tries to ensure, as pointed 
out before, that there will not be gaps in responsibility. However, a closer look at the co-
respondent mechanism shows that certain gaps in accountability would still remain after 
the EU’s accession. This section is divided into three parts. First, it will examine how 
the co-respondent mechanism operates in cases in which the validity of EU primary law 
is put into question. The second part focuses on the validity of EU secondary norms, 
while the third examines other situations in which EU law can appear in an incidental 
manner.  
i. Breach of the ECHR by Primary Law 
To deal with breaches of the ECHR stemming from EU primary norms, ie, the Treaties, 
Article 3(3) of the draft Agreement provides that:  
Where an application is directed against the European Union, the European Union 
member States may become co-respondents to the proceedings in respect of an alleged 
violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into question the 
compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or any other 
provision having the same legal value pursuant to those instruments, notably where that 
violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under those 
instruments. 
The co-respondent mechanism thus tries to deal with situations like the one that 
occurred in Matthews.
28
 The co-respondent mechanism recognises that in those cases in 
which the breach stems from a rule enshrined in a treaty, it is necessary to hold the 
Member States liable. The liability of the Member States would ensure that the treaty 
                                               
28
 Matthews v United Kingdom, Series A 24833/94, (1999) 28 EHRR 36; Lock (n 18) 171. 
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provision would be modified following Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU).
29
 However, this provision raises many questions as regards its practical 
application. For instance, the responsibility of the EU in this scenario, while symbolic, 
is not justified by a coherent legal doctrine of attribution of responsibility.
30
 First, if 
there is an incompatibility between a provision of the ECHR and a provision of the EU 
Treaties, the Member States were the ones that negotiated, agreed, signed and ratified 
that incompatibility in the first place. Therefore, it would make sense to hold them 
liable. Second, since the Member States are the driving force behind any treaty 
modification, to hold them responsible alongside the EU for a breach stemming from a 
treaty provision would be redundant. Third, the EU comprises its Member States, 
especially in situations in which the compatibility of EU law with international law is 
put into question. Article 216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) clearly recognises this when it states that agreements concluded by the 
EU are binding upon the institutions of the EU and on its Member States. Moreover, the 
CJEU has extended this provision to apply to the decisions of the bodies set by those 
agreements.
31
 
 However, it is the exact scope of EU–Member State intervention that casts doubt 
on the practical functioning of the co-respondent mechanism in this scenario. First, 
given the rationale underpinning the mechanism, it would be expected that all EU 
Member States would have to act as co-respondents. Even though this is not entirely 
clear in the draft Agreement and the Explanatory Report, it would be the only way to 
ensure that there were no gaps in responsibility.
32
 However, as will be further explained 
below, the voluntary nature of the mechanism
33
 does not guarantee this result. More 
precisely, a hypothetical judgment of the ECtHR in this scenario would most likely fall 
within the scope of Article 48(6) and (7) TEU. By virtue of this provision, unanimity in 
the European Council is a conditio sine qua non to reform the Treaties.
34
 Thus, if a 
                                               
29
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Member State does not join the proceedings, there are no assurances that the treaty 
reform that would lead the conflict with the ECHR being solved will take place.  
 By way of an example, in a situation like Matthews, all the Member States 
would be invited to join. However, there is the possibility that certain Member States 
might decide not to join the proceedings. For instance, in a case similar to Matthews, it 
would be rather unlikely that Spain would join the proceedings as a co-respondent. 
Spain already expressed its unease to the previous Matthews case by bringing an action 
to the CJEU against its implementation.
35
 By not joining the other EU Member States as 
co-respondents, Spain would avoid being internationally bound to renegotiate a part of 
the EU Treaties it does not want to compromise on. Consequently, in this scenario, the 
co-respondent would not effectively fill the gap in responsibility because of its 
voluntary nature.  
 Second, the wording of the co-respondent mechanism as regards breaches 
stemming from EU primary law seems to adopt a narrow approach to the situations in 
which these kinds of breaches might arise. The co-respondent mechanism rightly 
reflects that the most likely scenario in which this kind of situation might arise will be 
in cases brought against the EU. However, it cannot be excluded that a breach of 
primary EU law might also arise in proceedings brought against EU Member States. Yet 
neither paragraph 2 nor paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the draft Agreement allows EU 
Member States to become co-respondents in actions brought against other EU Member 
States. So, should that claim be declared inadmissible ratio personae? Taking into 
account that the ECtHR allows individuals to bring cases without the need of legal 
counsel and how the EU’s executive federalism dilutes the visibility of EU law, it would 
create an unfair burden on the individual if her claim is declared inadmissible and has to 
bring a new one. For instance, an individual could see her case declared inadmissible 
because it was not able to identify that her fundamental rights were violated not only by 
the Member State she is bringing the case against but also by a provision of the EU 
Treaties.  
 Overall, the co-respondent mechanism deals with most of the situations in which 
a breach of the ECHR might stem from a provision of EU primary law. However, the 
voluntary nature of the mechanism can create problems as regards the reparation of the 
                                               
35
 Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-7917. 
12 
 
wrongful act. Also, the co-respondent mechanism does not allow certain possibilities, 
such as permitting EU Member States to act as co-respondents in actions brought 
against other EU Member States, which could place an extra burden on the claimant. 
The narrow wording of the provision combined with the voluntary nature of the 
mechanism cast some shadows over the practical effectiveness of the co-respondent 
mechanism.  
ii. Breach of the ECHR by Secondary Law 
Article 3(2) of the draft Agreement enshrines the way in which the EU and its Member 
States will participate in those proceedings in which the compatibility of EU secondary 
legislation with the ECHR is called into question. The paragraph reads as follows:  
2. Where an application is directed against one or more member States of the 
European Union, the European Union may become a co-respondent to the proceedings 
in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation 
calls into question the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of 
European Union law, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by 
disregarding an obligation under European Union law. 
The provision provides, inter alia, for the participation of the EU in proceedings brought 
against its Member States when they implement EU secondary legislation. In this 
regard, the Explanatory Report makes reference to the specific example of EU executive 
federalism as one of the reasons for the adoption of the co-respondent mechanism.
36
 
Member States implement EU regulations and directives on a daily basis. Therefore, 
questions on responsibility and locus standi in those situations are likely to appear in 
front of the Strasbourg Court.
37
 Nevertheless, the provision is also designed to cover 
other situations. The use of the expression ‘provision of European Union Law’ also 
gives the EU the possibility to intervene in proceedings in which EU primary law is 
called into question. The Explanatory Report explicitly mentions this possibility.
38
  
 However, the broad scope for EU participation in these kinds of scenarios is not 
matched by the participation of Member States. It could be argued that the participation 
of EU Member States is not necessary in this case, since it is only the EU that can solve 
the incompatibility. In this respect, the participation of the EU is necessary in order to 
fill any gap in responsibility. Despite the logic underpinning the co-respondent 
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mechanism, there are some issues concerning the internal coherence of paragraph 2, 
especially as regards the role of the Member States. Two comments need to be made in 
this respect. 
 First, if the participation of the EU is necessary in order to solve the issue of the 
compatibility of an EU secondary norm and the ECHR, is the presence of the EU 
Member States really necessary? The co-respondent mechanism does not provide for 
any exit once it has been initiated.
39
 Neither the Member States nor the EU can leave the 
proceedings once the ‘correct’ party has joined them. If the EU is the only one thatcan 
put an end to the breach of the ECHR, why should an EU Member State continue to be 
a respondent? It is submitted that this situation places the EU Member State identified 
in an unequal situation. Since the other EU Member States cannot join proceedings 
brought against other Member States,
40
 why should the Member State targeted continue 
to be a part of the case, and not the others? Furthermore, the Explanatory Report slightly 
shows this inconsistency. According to the Report, Article 3(2) of the draft Agreement 
would apply ‘if an alleged violation could only have been avoided by a member State 
disregarding an obligation under EU law (for example, when an EU law provision 
leaves no discretion to a member State as to its implementation at the national level)’.41 
Therefore, if no discretion is left to the Member States, it can be assumed that not only 
the Member States against which the case is being brought is violating the ECHR, but 
also the other 27. Hence, why this differentiated approach?  
 Second, the draft Agreement includes in Article 3(7) a rule concerning the 
responsibility under the co-respondent mechanism. The paragraph reads as follows:  
If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party is a co-respondent to the 
proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-respondent shall be jointly 
responsible for that violation, unless the Court, on the basis of the reasons given by the 
respondent and the co-respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant, decides 
that only one of them be held responsible. 
The provision establishes the joint responsibility of the co-respondents as the general 
rule of responsibility. Leaving aside general considerations about joint responsibility 
and given the design of the co-respondent mechanism, establishing the joint 
responsibility of the EU and the Member State(s) which is a party to the proceedings 
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would seem a bit uneven for two main reasons. First, joint responsibility would be non-
existent if the individual would only have targeted the EU. Since EU Member States 
cannot join all the proceedings as co-respondents,
42
 there might be a situation in which 
identical facts could lead to different responsibilities.
43
 Identical facts could lead to 
either the EU’s exclusive responsibility or joint responsibility of the EU and a Member 
State depending on who the individual initially targeted. Second, if we assume that joint 
responsibility is necessary to strengthen the effectiveness of the judgment, then the 
other Member States which are not co-respondents should also bear the responsibility. 
This becomes especially relevant in those situations in which there was no discretion for 
the EU Member States. These concerns show how joint responsibility within the co-
respondent mechanism has no legal foundations behind it. It has been assumed to be the 
easy solution as regards responsibility within the ECHR, but the drafters have not really 
thought about its position within the overall structure of the mechanism.  
 Moreover, these deficiencies in the mechanism have the potential to create legal 
uncertainty not only for the individual affected by the breach of the ECHR but also as 
regards the EU Member States. Consequently the proposed internal rules should really 
spell out the role of the Member States in the co-respondent mechanism well.  
iii. Heterodox EU Law and the Co-respondent Mechanism 
The Explanatory Report explains that the reasons for the adoption of the co-respondent 
mechanism model are rooted in the sui generis nature of the EU: 
It is a special feature of the EU legal system that acts adopted by its institutions may be 
implemented by its member States and, conversely, that provisions of the EU founding 
treaties agreed upon by its member States may be implemented by institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies of the EU. With the accession of the EU, there could arise the unique 
situation in the Convention system in which a legal act is enacted by one High 
Contracting Party and implemented by another.
44
 
In spite of this, EU law nowadays (and especially since the Treaty of Lisbon) does not 
always operate on the basis of the same principles which gave the EU legal order its 
autonomous character. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) would be a 
good example in this regard. To what extent would the actions of the EU Member States 
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by virtue of a CFSP provision fall within the scope of the co-respondent mechanism? 
EU principles like primacy or direct effect seem not to apply in this part of the EU legal 
order.
45
 Moreover, the CJEU lacks jurisdiction over this policy.
46
 Therefore, it seems 
plausible to argue that in principle, the actions of the EU Member States falling within 
the CFSP would not be covered by the co-respondent mechanism. A previous version of 
the draft Agreement seemed to point in that direction. Article 59(bb) of the ECHR as 
amended by Article 1 of the draft Agreement would have read as follows: 
[A]cts and measures are not attributable to the European Union where they have been 
performed or adopted in the context of the provisions of the Treaty on European Union 
on the common foreign and security policy of the European Union, except in cases 
where attributability to the European Union on the basis of European Union law has 
been established by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
47
 
This article created plenty of concerns as regards accountability and legal certainty. As a 
response, the European Commission assured the other parties that ‘this rule would not 
have as effect to exclude any acts taken under the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
from the Court’s jurisdiction but only to identify to whom the act is attributable’.48 
Nevertheless, some High Contracting Parties were not convinced by the EU’s 
statement.
49
 The ECtHR’s lack of jurisdiction over the CFSP would be very difficult to 
argue once the EU is a High Contracting Party to the ECHR. If the acts falling within 
the CFSP could be attributed to the EU, does it mean that these actions are attributable 
to its Member States? As a result, the Explanatory Report tries to clarify the situation by 
drawing a parallelism for the first pillar and equating the implementation of the CFSP 
with the implementation of EU law.
50
 Therefore, by assimilating the CFSP into more 
orthodox EU legislation, the draft Agreement solves the question of whether the CFSP 
would fall within the scope of the co-respondent mechanism.  
 Conversely, some aspects in the area of freedom, security and justice are going 
to fall outside the scope of the co-respondent mechanism. More specifically, those 
aspects linked with mutual recognition, and judicial cooperation will not be covered by 
the co-respondent mechanism In these areas the EU only lays down a framework in 
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which the Member States operate. EU Member States do not implement EU law stricto 
sensu in these areas. This is reflected in the Explanatory Report:  
It is understood that a third party intervention may often be the most appropriate way to 
involve the EU in a case. For instance, if an application is directed against a State 
associated to parts of the EU legal order through separate international agreements (for 
example, the ‘Schengen’ and ‘Dublin’ agreements and the agreement on the European 
Economic Area) concerning obligations arising from such agreements, third party 
intervention would be the only way for the EU to participate in the proceedings. The 
issue of the EU requesting leave to intervene will be dealt with in separate Memoranda 
of Understanding between the EU and the concerned States, upon their request.
51
 
Even in these scenarios, the EU would have a say as a third party instead of as a co-
respondent. Whereas there should not be a problem with leaving these areas outside the 
co-respondent mechanism and allowing the EU to intervene as another third party, the 
fact that they will also be left outside the cross-referral procedure between the ECtHR 
and the CJEU might be seen as problematic. The Explanatory Report links the 
possibility to refer an ongoing case in the ECtHR to the CJEU to those cases in which 
only the validity of the EU instrument is put into question.
52
 Therefore, these scenarios 
would not be covered by the co-respondent mechanism or the cross-referral procedure, 
but perhaps in certain cases a potential interpretation of the CJEU might be required 
nonetheless.
53
  
 This section has shown how the draft Agreement and its Explanatory Report try 
to lay down a procedure to deal with the EU’s participation in the ECtHR. The 
establishment of the co-respondent mechanism tries to ensure respect for the division of 
competence between the EU and its Member States while at the same time giving legal 
certainty to the individual involved in the proceedings. Nevertheless, the mechanism is 
not very successful in taking into account these two interests. On the one hand, the 
voluntary nature of the participation casts some doubts on the ex ante willingness of the 
EU and its Member States to assume their responsibilities under the ECHR. On the 
other hand, the mechanism should be more exhaustive in dealing with the different 
ways in which EU law could interact with the ECHR. Even though it is pointless to 
advance an alternative to the co-respondent mechanism,
54
 it is submitted that the further 
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developments of the mechanism either externally or through internal rules are necessary 
so as to provide a right balance between legal certainty and the autonomy of the EU 
legal order.  
III. The Principle of Unity in External Representation and the 
Voluntary Nature of the Mechanism 
3.1 The Voluntary Nature of the EU’s Participation in the Proceedings 
As already mentioned in the previous sections, one of the main flaws of the co-
respondent mechanism is its voluntary character. Article 3(2) and (3) of the draft 
Agreement points in this direction when using expressions like ‘the European Union 
may become a co-respondent’ and ‘the European Union member States may become co-
respondents’. In the same vein, Article 3(5) provides that, inter alia: ‘A High 
Contracting Party shall become a co-respondent either by accepting an invitation by the 
Court or by decision of the Court upon the request of that High Contracting Party.’ The 
wording of all these provisions denotes the idea that the High Contracting Parties have 
the last word as to becoming co-respondents. Regardless of whether they actually bear 
responsibility for the violation, the EU and/or its Member States can avoid being held 
responsible by simply not joining the proceedings. This is confirmed by the Explanatory 
Report, which clearly states that:  
No High Contracting Party may be compelled against its will to become a co-
respondent. This reflects the fact that the initial application was not addressed against 
the potential co-respondent, and that no High Contracting Party can be forced to become 
a party to a case where it was not named in the original application.
55
 
The voluntary nature of the co-respondent mechanism raises many concerns. On the one 
hand, while it preserves the autonomy of the EU legal order,
56
 it can potentially create 
uncertainty as to who is going to intervene in the proceedings. Allowing the EU and its 
Member States to decide whether to join can create inconsistencies as regards their 
expected intervention, since they might decide that for a specific case, it is better not to 
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intervene. Furthermore, as highlighted above, the voluntary nature of the mechanism 
can put its effectiveness at risk, especially in those cases in which unanimity is needed.  
 In a nutshell, the voluntary nature could also negatively affect the unity of the 
external representation of the EU and the coordination within the ECtHR. Since EU 
Member States are not obliged by the co-respondent mechanism, they could decide not 
to join the proceedings based on their own national interests. In this regard, it is argued 
that the duty of cooperation will play a fundamental role in the relationship between the 
EU and its Member States in the ECtHR.  
B. The Duty of Cooperation and the Co-respondent Mechanism  
Two issues will be discussed in this section: first, how the duty of cooperation would 
operate when the co-respondent mechanism is triggered; and, second, the implications 
during the proceedings. It is argued that, in the absence of any internal arrangements, 
the duty of cooperation has the potential to solve most of the problematic issues 
concerning the participation of the EU in ECtHR proceedings.  
i. Voluntary Nature as a Matter of International Law: Voluntary Nature as a 
Matter of EU Law?  
Whereas the voluntary nature of the co-respondent mechanism as a matter of 
international law is beyond doubt, as a matter of EU law, it is not that clear. Eckes 
rightly points out: ‘what is certain is that the EU’s accession to the ECHR is susceptible 
of entailing different and further-going duties for the Member States under EU law than 
the Member States’ own participation entails under international law’.57 Hence, it could 
be argued that the Member States would have an obligation to intervene as matter of EU 
law. Regardless of the voluntary nature of the mechanism, the mixed nature of the 
ECHR and more precisely the unity of external representation of EU could limit the 
extent to which EU Member States can refuse to join the mechanism. In this regard, 
some recent CJEU cases would support this argument. For instance, the Court of Justice 
held in Etang de Berre that:  
Since the Convention and the Protocol thus create rights and obligations in a field 
covered in large measure by Community legislation, there is a Community interest in 
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compliance by both the Community and its Member States with the commitments 
entered into under those instruments.
58
 
By assimilating a mixed agreement to a pure EU agreement,
59
 the Court not only 
expanded its interpretative jurisdiction over areas not covered by EU competence, it 
also showed that in mixed agreements, the relations between the EU and its Member 
States are not regulated by international law, but rather by internal law.
60
 Moreover, the 
special relation that the EU and its Member States have when implementing mixed 
agreements can impose stringent obligations on EU Member States that could also mean 
that they have to exercise their autonomous treaty-making powers. In the Berne 
Convention case,
61
 the Court recognised that Ireland had failed in its obligations under 
EU law by not signing the Berne Convention, an agreement to which the EU was not a 
member due to its lack of competence on the issue.
62
 In this regard, it has been argued 
that there is an EU interest in ensuring the implementation of mixed agreements in their 
entirety, regardless of the competence involved.
63
  
 Therefore, inter alia, it could be argued that within the framework of the ECHR 
and its co-respondent mechanisms, EU Member States have an obligation as a matter of 
EU law to intervene in the co-respondent mechanism when invited to do so by the 
ECtHR. In this regard, a negative response would cast some doubts over their 
willingness to comply with the ECHR, which would go against the interests of the EU. 
This would become especially relevant in those cases in which the participation of a 
Member State is needed, such as those in which the compatibility of the ECHR with EU 
primary norms is at stake. Thus, the duty of cooperation would, to a certain extent, limit 
Member States’ autonomy in deciding whether to intervene or not in a specific case. 
Moreover, the Commission could bring an infringement action against EU Member 
States for their decision not to intervene as a co-respondent.  
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ii. A Single Voice in Strasbourg 
Besides limiting the scope of Member States’ autonomy as to their decision to join the 
EU as a co-respondent, the duty of cooperation would also apply when pleading in the 
ECtHR. The duty of cooperation would not only ensure that a Member State becomes a 
co-respondent, it would also limit their autonomy on what exactly to plead.  
 Following well-established case law,
64
 the joint participation of the EU and its 
Member States in the ECtHR proceedings will undoubtedly require close cooperation 
and coordination. In this regard, this close cooperation would usually entail that EU 
Member States would not be allowed to deviate from the previously agreed EU 
position. In this particular scenario, this will entail not to argue differently from what 
the EU has argued. This could become a problematic issue given that the interests of the 
EU and its Member States could differ greatly.  
IV. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has tried to show the current way in which the draft Agreement and its 
Explanatory Report deal with the EU’s participation in the ECtHR’s proceedings; it has 
yet to strike the right balance between the different interests involved, mainly the 
autonomy of the EU legal order and legal certainty. In this respect, the co-respondent 
mechanism aims at proceduralising the issue. This fact has two main consequences: 
first, it postpones the solution to the conflict between the diverging interests to a later 
stage; and, second, any solution to this conflict or balance would be contextualised, ie. it 
would not be in principle possible to draw general conclusions on it. Whereas this 
managerial approach could be a good way to deal with mixed participation in 
international agreements,
65
 the specific shape that it takes in the draft Agreement raises 
plenty of legal questions.  
 The co-respondent mechanism, with its voluntary nature and joint responsibility, 
gives pre-eminence to the concerns over the autonomy of the EU legal order and the 
                                               
64
 Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (PFOS) [2010] ECR I-03317; Case C-266/03 Commission v 
Luxembourg (Inland Waterways) [2005] ECR I-06985; Case C-433/03 Commission v Germany (Inland 
Waterways) [2005] ECR I-04805; Case C-45/07 Commission v Greece (IMO) [2010] ECR I-00701; Opinion 
1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the 
protection of intellectual property [1994] ECR I-05267. 
65
 Heliskoski (n 20). 
21 
 
concerns on legal certainty by the individuals suffering from human rights violations. 
Inasmuch as the co-respondent mechanism allows the EU and its Member States to 
decide whether or not to join proceedings against the other, that decision would always 
have to be approached on an ad hoc basis which cannot be generalised, leading to 
uncertainty as to whether in similar situations the outcome for the co-respondent would 
be the same. It is submitted that another way to strike this balance is needed. Even joint 
participation in all cases (which would have no legal foundations whatsoever) would 
seem to be a better solution than leaving the decision to intervene (and to be held 
responsible) to the discretion of the EU and its Member States.  
 This chapter has also argued that insofar as there are not yet internal 
arrangements on the participation in the ECtHR, the duty of cooperation would play a 
very big role in this. Furthermore, in the absence of internal arrangements, the duty of 
cooperation could solve some of the problems entailed by joint participation. However, 
a duty does not entail a legal obligation, so it cannot be considered the panacea to apply 
in the absence of clear legal rules.  
